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PLEA B ARGAINS O NLY FOR THE G UILTY

Oren Bar-Gill* and Oren Gazal**

Abstract
A major concern with plea bargains is that innocent defendants will be induced to plead
guilty. This paper argues that the law can address this concern by providing prosecutors
with incentives to select cases in which the probability of guilt is high. By restricting the
permissible sentence reduction in a plea bargain the law can preclude plea bargains in
cases where the probability of conviction is low (L cases). The prosecutor will therefore
be forced to – (1) select fewer L cases and proceed to trial with these cases; or (2) select
more cases with a higher probability of conviction (H cases) that can be concluded via a
less-costly plea bargain. As long as the probability of conviction is positively correlated
with the probability of guilt, this selection-of-cases effect implies a reduced number of
innocent defendants that accept plea bargains. We argue that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines in fact achieve, albeit inadvertently, this socially desirable selection effect.
We further argue that more limited discretion in sentencing facilitates the selection-ofcases effect. In this respect, the Federal Guidelines are superior to some of the state- level
guidelines that leave considerable room for discretion in sentencing.
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1. Introduction
About 95% of all convictions in the United States are secured with a guilty plea,
most of them through plea bargaining. 1 Yet despite their prevalence, or perhaps due to it,
plea bargains remain one of the most controversial practices in the criminal justice
system. 2 The fear that innocent defendants would plead guilty animates the often heated
debate over plea bargains. 3 And imposing sanctions on the innocent is not only morally
wrong, it is also inefficient. 4
Importantly, most of the responsibility for the wrongful convictions problem lies
not on the plea bargain institution, but rather on the inherent inaccuracy of the
adjudication process. In an ideal, error- free adjudication system no innocent defendant
would ever plead guilty. In fact, given the imperfections of the system, it has been argued
that plea bargains can only help the risk-averse defendant, guilty or innocent. 5
Facing a credible threat by the prosecutor to proceed to trial, an innocent
defendant may indeed benefit from a plea bargain. But the prosecutor cannot credibly
1

See U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics,
2001, 2 (2003) ("the proportion of convicted defendants who plead guilty increased from 87% during 1990
to 95% during 2001"); U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of
Convicted Felons, 2000, 43 (2003) (95% of felony convictions in State courts were achieved through guilty
plea).
2
See, e.g., Tomas W. Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice", 13 L. & Soc'y Rev. 509 (1979); Conrad G.
Brunk, The Problem of Voluntariness Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 L. & Soc'y Rev. 527 (1979);
Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic's Rejoinder, 13 L. & Soc'y Rev. 555 (1979); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. Legal Stud. 43 (1988); Robert E. Scott &
William J Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909 (1992); Stephen J Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 Yale L.J. 1979 (1992); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller The
Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (2002); Albert W. Alschuler, Straining at Gnats and
Swallowing Camels: The Selective Morality of Professor Bibas, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1412 (2003).
3
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 652, 679-80 (1981);
Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in Federal Courts, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
293, 309-10 (1975).
4
See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J. L. & Econ. 1
(1994).
5
See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & Econ. 61 (1971); Scott and
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1938.
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threaten to take every case to trial. Her budget constraint will generally allo w for only a
very small number of trials. The prosecutor’s ex ante decision which cases to pursue is,
therefore, of central importance. And since the prosecutor’s goals will generally diverge
from the social objective, there is a real danger that the prosecutor will choose the wrong
cases. 6 Specifically, society’s preference for wrongful acquittals over wrongful
convictions 7 might not be reflected in the prosecutor’s choice of cases. 8 And since plea
bargains increase the number of cases the prosecutor can pursue within a given budget
constraint, the plea bargain institution exacerbates the consequences of this divergence
between social objectives and the prosecutor’s private goals.
Can the law cure this divergence, or at least minimize it? This paper argues that it
can, and in fact it already does, albeit inadvertently. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
allow a maximal sentence reduction of approximately 25% from the benchmark sentence
for the offence (including relevant circumstances surrounding the offence) in return for a
guilty plea. Under the Guidelines, a defendant can receive a two-level reduction in the
offence level, translating into a sentence reduction of about 20-25%, if he "clearly
demonstrate[s] acceptance of responsibility."9 While "acceptance of responsibility" is not

6

Compare: Gene M. Grossman and Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare, 73 Amer. Econ.
Rev. 749 (1983) and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 Amer.
Econ. Rev. 713 (1988), who adopt the assumption that the prosecutor maximizes social welfare.
7
This social preference is grounded both in moral theory – see Ronald M. Dworkin, Principle, Policy,
Procedure, in Ronald M. Dworkin (ed.), A Matter of Principle 72 (1985), and in economic theory – see
Oren Bar-Gill, The Efficiency of Protecting the Innocent, mimeo, Harvard Law School (2004).
8
This will be true under many different assumptions regarding the structure of the prosecutor’s objective
function. In the formal model developed in Section 2, we assume, as is common in the law and economics
literature, that the prosecutor maximizes the overall expected sanction across all chosen cases. Similar
results would obtain if we assume that the prosecutor is driven mainly by a desire to win cases (i.e. to
convict or to secure a guilty plea). See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36
U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 105-112 (1968) (describing prosecutors who care about maintaining high “batting
averages”). See also id. at 58-64 (prosecutors do not generally decline to prosecute defendants whose guilt
they doubt; rather they bring the greatest pressure to plead guilty to bear on such defendants).
9
See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. In some cases the defendant can receive an additional one level reduction.

20
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art30

4

Gazal and Bar-Gill:

equivalent to “pleading guilty,”10 in practice only defendants that plead guilty are
considered eligible for these sentence reductions. By restricting the prosecutor’s ability to
offer a significantly reduced sentence as part of a plea bargain, the Guidelines induce the
selection of stronger cases in which the defendant is more likely to be guilty.
To see how the Sentencing Guidelines reduce the number of innocent defe ndants
accepting a plea bargain, divide the universe of cases into two sub groups: cases with a
high (≥

3
4

) probability of conviction (H cases), and cases with a low (< 34 ) probability of

conviction (L cases). The plea bargain sanction would have to be lower in the L cases,
often lower than three-quarters of the sentence that the defendant would have received at
trial, if convicted. Under the Guidelines, however, such a plea bargain would be
unenforceable. Accordingly, the prosecutor would have to choose between trying L cases
and substituting L cases with H cases. 11 As demonstrated below, the rule adopted by the
Sentencing Guidelines leads to the selection of fewer L cases, and to a smaller overall
number of cases. As long as the probability of conviction is positively correlated with the
probability of guilt, this implies a reduced number of innocent defendants that accept plea
bargains. 12
We show that the selection-of-cases effect that reduces the number of innocent
defendants entering into plea bargains is most powerful when the benchmark sentence is
well defined. Our analysis thus supports the limited sentencing discretion permitted under

10

See United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171 (3rd Cir.1998).
Bibas recently observed that fixed discounts may “deter prosecutions of the possible innocent.”
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 2536 (2004).
12
This result must be qualified if we believe that innocent individuals are systematically more risk averse
than guilty individuals (see, e.g., Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains,
Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 Yale L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992)). Such heterogeneity in the
degree of risk aversion implies that innocent individuals would be willing to accept plea bargains with
higher, not lower, sentences. This qualification notwithstanding it seems that the direct effect of innocence
on the expected sanction will generally outweigh the effect of heterogeneous risk preferences.
11
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the Federal Guidelines. The broader discretion permitted under state- level sentencing
guidelines while not eliminating the selection-of-cases effect does dilute the force of the
selection effect. Discretion in sentencing clearly serves an important social purpose. The
cost of greater discretion, however, cannot be ignored.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally derives the
selection-of-cases result. Section 3 offers concluding remarks, focusing on possible
implementation problems and on the deterrence implications of the selection effect.

2. Model
Let p denote the probability of conviction, and s denote the expected sentence
following a conviction—the benchmark sentence. Let Ω denote the universe of cases,
where each case is characterized by its (p, s) pair. The universe of cases, Ω , can be
divided into two, mutually exclusive sub- groups: cases with a high probability of
conviction, i.e. with p ≥ α ∈ (0,1) (H cases): Ω H ≡ {( p, s ) ( p , s) ∈ Ω, p ≥ α }, and cases
with

a

low

probability

of

conviction,

i.e.

with

p<α

(L

cases):

Ω L ≡ {( p, s ) ( p, s ) ∈ Ω, p < α }. Let q = ps denote the expected sanction, and let f H (q )
and f L (q ) represent the distribution of cases, according to expected sanction, in Ω H and

Ω L , respectively.
As is conventional in the law and economics literature on plea bargaining, we
assume that the prosecutor’s private goal is to maximize the sum of expected sanctions
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subject to a budget constraint, B. 13 A plea bargain costs the prosecutor c, while a trial
costs c + x.14
For simplicity, assume that if a plea bargain is reached, the agreed sentence equals
ps.15 Assume that due to risk-aversion and/or litigation costs, without the restriction
imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines, all cases end in a plea bargain. Finally, to make
things interesting, assume that without the Guidelines’ restrictions, some of the selected
cases are in Ω H and some are in Ω L .16
The following lemma summarizes the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on the
prosecutor’s selection of cases.

Lemma: A legal rule that renders a plea bargain unenforceable unless it specifies a
sentence exceeding α times the benchmark sentence for the offence, i.e., a rule
restricting the permissible sentence reduction to (1 − α ) ⋅ s , will lead the prosecutor to
select fewer L cases, a higher, lower, or unchanged number of H cases, and a lower
overall number of cases.

Remark: The intuition for this result, which is proved in the Appendix, is as follows.
Since pursuing L cases under the Sentencing Guidelines requires a costly trial, the
prosecutor will select fewer L cases. The effect on the number of H cases is ambiguous.

13

See, e.g., Landes, supra note 5, at 63.
In our formal model we assume that all trials are equally costly and all plea bargains are equally costly.
This clearly unrealistic assumption is made for expositional purposes only. Our main results continue to
hold under more realistic differential costs assumptions.
15
The analysis remains qualitatively unchanged if we assume only that the plea-bargain sentence is
positively correlated with ps.
16
If without judicial scrutiny, all the cases selected by the prosecutor are in Ω H , judicial scrutiny will
have no effect on the selection of cases.
14
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There are two possible scenarios. Under the first scenario, the Guidelines le ad to the
selection of more H cases ( q SH < q NS ). Since the prosecutor can only pursue an L case
through a costly trial, she may well prefer more H plea bargains with a lower per-case
sanction over fewer L trials with a higher per-case expected sanction. Under the second
scenario, the Guidelines lead not only to the selection of fewer L cases, but also to the
selection of fewer H cases ( q SH ≤ q NS ). If the prosecutor still chooses a significant number
of L cases, the added trial costs might force her to take-on fewer H cases. The overall
number of cases clearly declines under the second scenario. It also declines under the first
scenario, since the prosecutor at most substitutes one L case for one H case.

Based on the preceding lemma, the following proposition establishes the
desirability of the restrictions imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines.

Proposition: As long as the probability of conviction is positively correlated with the
probability of guilt, the Sentencing Guidelines, by rendering unenforceable plea bargains
with sentence reductions exceeding 1 − α of the benchmark sentence for the offense, will
reduce the number of innocent defendants that accept plea bargains.

Remarks : The intuition for this result, whose formal proof is omitted, is as follows. The
Sentencing Guidelines affect the prosecutor’s selection of cases in two ways. First, they
induce substitution from L cases to H cases. Second, they reduce the overall number of
cases that the prosecutor can pursue. As long as the probability of conviction is positively
correlated with the probability of guilt, the first effect results in a reduced number of
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innocent defendants accepting a plea bargain. The second effect reduces the number of
innocent defendants that are pursued by the prosecutor, and therefore also reduces the
number of innocent defendants accepting a plea bargain. 17

3. Concluding Remarks
We conclude by discussing several issues pertaining to the implementability and
the deterrence consequences of the sentencing principles analyzed in this paper.
(1) Uncertainty with respect to the Benchmark Sentence: A key feature of the Federal
Guidelines is the narrow range within which a defendant’s sentence must be set (based on
the offense level, the defendant’s criminal history and a few additional factors). This
strictness of the Federal Guidelines allows for an accurate determination of the
benchmark sentence for the offence (s in our model). A common estimate of the
benchmark sentence, shared by the prosecutor, the defendant and the court, is critical for
a regime that restricts plea bargain sentences relative to the benchmark sentence for the
offence. Therefore, the limited discretion allowed under the Federal Guidelines facilitates
the socially desirable impact of the guidelines on the prosecutor’s selection of cases.
But even under less strict guidelines, such as the state- level sentencing guidelines,
a selection-of-cases effect, albeit a weaker one, exists. If the relevant sentencing
guidelines leave considerable discretion, such that the benchmark sentence may fall

17

While we focus on the reduction in the number of innocent defendants who plead guilty, the restrictions
imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines also reduce the average sentence imposed on the innocent
defendants who plead guilty despite these restrictions. To the extent that the Guidelines induce substitution
from L cases to H cases, they result in plea bargains characterized by both a lower probability of innocence
and a lower sanction. We acknowledge, however, that to the extent that the Guidelines induce prosecutors
to try (rather than plea) L cases, they will hurt the innocent defendants who are deprived of the plea bargain
option. The tradeoff is between fewer innocent people facing the risk of prosecution and a greater risk—the
trial risk—for those few who are forced to stand trial. Cf. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 12, at 2013.
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anywhere within a [s, s ] range, still plea bargain sentences below α ⋅ s would be avoided.
Accordingly, sufficiently weak L cases where the likelihood of guilt is especially low
would not be selected. Still, the analysis in this paper identifies an advantage of strict
sentencing guidelines.
(2) Charge Bargaining and Fact Bargaining: Even absent uncertainty regarding the
benchmark sentence, the selection-of-cases effect would disappear if charge bargaining
or fact bargaining were permitted. While such circumvention should not be
underestimated, the problem is not unique to the selection-of-cases result. Rather, the
prevention of charge and fact bargaining is crucial to the efficacy of any sentencing
guidelines. 18 And, accordingly, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal
Guidelines themselves explicitly restrict the enforceability of such agreements. 19

18

See Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post- Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1284 (1997). See also William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 2548 (2004). A more fundamental objection to our selection-of-cases argument questions the
link between the expected trial outcome and the plea bargain sentence, even absent charge and fact
bargaining. See Bibas, supra note 11.
19
See, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(5) (allowing the court to review charge bargains and fact bargains and accept or
reject the agreement); U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a) (Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements - Policy
Statement: "[T]he court may accept the agreement if the court determines, for reasons stated on the record,
that the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and that
accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing
guidelines. However, a plea agreement that includes the dismissal of a charge or a plea agreement not to
pursue a potential charge shall not preclude the conduct underlying such charge from being considered
under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in connection with the count(s) of which the defendant
is convicted "). See also the recent policy guidelines issued by the Attorney General John Ashcroft, Justice
Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges and Sentencing,
memo issued (U.S. Dep't of Justice Sept. 29, 2003) (instructing prosecutor to pursue the most serious
readily provable offences, and prohibiting fact bargaining or any other "plea agreement that result in the
sentencing court having less than a full understanding of all readily provable facts relevant to sentencing".)
Another effective way to prevent fact bargaining and to restrict charge bargaining is to prohibit any precharge negotiations. A comparative perspective is informative. While in the U.S. it is very common for the
prosecutor to be involved in the criminal investigation, thus opening the door to pre-charge negotiations,
this practice is uncommon in other common law countries, like England and Israel. In these legal systems
the prosecutor is rarely involved in the police investigation. The indictment is often based only on the
information provided in the dossier, and charges are brought before the prosecutor even meets the
defendant (or his attorney). Consequently, plea bargaining takes place only after the indictment is filed. See
JOHN SPRACK, EMMINS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 251 (9th Edition, 2002). For other ways of limiting
prosecutors’ power to charge bargain - see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
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(3) Deterrence: The overall effect of the sentencing restrictions imposed by the
Sentencing Guidelines on deterrence is indeterminate. If the probability of guilt and the
probability of conviction are strongly correlated, these sentencing restrictions can lead
prosecutors to pursue fewer innocent defendants and more guilty defendants, thus
enhancing deterrence. 20 However, judicial scrutiny can also force the prosecutor to
pursue fewer guilty defendants, thus compromising deterrence. 21

100 M ICH. L. REV. 505, 594-95 (2001) (proposing constitutional limits on the sentencing implications of
the charges listed in the indictment as well as restrictions on mandatory minimum sentences as a way to
limit the benefits to prosecutors from overcharging and from charge bargaining).
20
To take an extreme case: if a guilty defendant will always face p > α , and only an innocent defendants
can face p < α , then setting free defendants with p < α enhances deterrence.
21
If the probability of guilt and the probability of conviction are only weakly correlated, the overall
deterrence effect will be smaller, but still ambiguous. Such weak correlation, however, implies that the
criminal justice system suffers from problems that are more fundamental than those caused by the plea
bargains institution.
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Appendix
The appendix contains the proof of the lemma.
Proof: We prove that the prosecutor will select fewer L cases. The reasoning supporting
the remaining parts of the lemma is provided in the text.
Let q H and qL represent the threshold values of the expected sanction, such that the
prosecutor selects cases with q ≥ qH in Ω H and cases with q ≥ q L in Ω L . Without the
restrictions imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines, the prosecutor solves:

∫

(1) max

qH , q L

q

qH

qf H ( q) dq +

∫

q

qL

s.t.

qf L ( q) dq

∫

q

qH

cf H ( q) dq +

∫

q

qL

cf L ( q) dq ≤ B .

With the restrictions imposed by the Guidelines, the prosecutor solves:

∫

(2) max

qH , q L

q

qH

qf H ( q) dq +

∫

q

qL

s.t.

qf L ( q) dq

∫

q

qH

cf H ( q) dq +

∫

q

qL

( c + x) f L ( q) dq ≤ B .

The Lagrangian is:
L=

∫

q

qH

q
 q

qfL ( q) dq − λ 
cf H ( q) dq +
( c + x ) f L (q) dq − B  ,
qL
q
q
 H
L

22
= λc and q L = λ ( c + x) , implying λ > 0 .

qf H (q) dq +

∫

q

∫

∫

and the FOCs are: q H
Since (1) is identical to (2) with x = 0, we have q HNS = qLNS = q NS (and λ NS = q NS c ).
When x > 0 , we have q SH < qSL (and λ S = qSH c = q SL ( c + x ) ). We can now prove that
qSL > q NS by contradiction. If q SL ≤ q NS , then q SH < q SL ≤ q NS , which violates the budget
constraint.
QED

22

The FOCs are derived from:
∂L
= − qH f ( qH ) + λ cf (q H ) = f ( qH ) [− qH + λ c] = 0
∂qH

∂L
= − qL f (q L ) + λ (c + x) f ( qL ) = f ( qL )[− qL + λ (c + x) ] = 0
∂qL
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